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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In response to the State's argument that Defendant/ 
Appellant Darrin L. Pelton directed Agent Acosta to Paco, the drug 
dealer, Appellant Pelton refers this Court to the Statement of the 
Facts submitted by the State wherein it acknowledged that Lorraine 
Coates, the party actually responsible for arranging the 
transaction, directed Acosta to Paco when she "called Paco over" to 
Acosta's car. Appellant Pelton directed Acosta to a 7-Eleven but, 
upon their arrival, nothing Pelton did or said was shown to have 
linked Paco to Acosta. Lorraine Coates "arranged" the drug 
transaction by introducing and directing Acosta to Paco. 
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Attorney'ror Defendant/Appellant 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890509-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Darrin Lamar Pelton relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, issues, the case, the facts, and the 
summary of the argument. Appellant responds to the State7s answer 
to his opening brief as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A CONVICTION. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
The State and Appellant Pelton generally agree on the facts 
presented at trial. Compare Appellee's brief at 3-4 with 
Appellant's brief at 2-6. One key exception, though, focuses on who 
ultimately directed Agent Acosta to Paco, the drug dealer. In its 
brief, the State argued: 
Defendant's acts in furtherance of the 
distribution of the cocaine were to direct the 
narcotics agent to the person who would eventually 
take the buy money, purchase the cocaine, and 
deliver the drug to the agent. Defendant entered 
Agent Acosta's car at a meeting point and directed 
the agent to another place where they would "call 
somebody and they would bring cocaine to us 
[Acosta and defendant] there." (T.Tr. at 8). 
Defendant traveled with Agent Acosta to the next 
meeting place, left Acosta's vehicle and 
approached the man who eventually secured the drug 
(T.Tr. at 8-9) . The fact that defendants 
involvement ceased at that point is attributable 
to Agent Acosta's request that defendant no longer 
be involved. (T.Tr. at 9-10). The fact that 
defendant directed Agent Acosta to the drug dealer 
and that defendant approached the dealer before 
the dealer contacted Acosta support[ed] the 
verdict of the trial court. 
Appellee's brief at 8-9. The State also repeatedly argued that 
defendant Pelton directed Agent Acosta to Paco, the drug dealer. 
Appellee's brief at 8-10. Absent from these arguments, however, 
were the following facts conceded by the State: 
After defendant and Baker spoke to Paco, Agent 
Acosta told the informant to call Coates over to 
Acosta7s car. (T.Tr. at 9). Acosta told her 
[Coates] that he was "uncomfortable with having 
[defendant] and [Baker] with [him]." (T.Tr. at 9). 
She [Coates1 told Acosta that she understood and 
called Paco over . . . . 
Appellee's brief at 4 (emphasis added). 
The role of Lorraine Coates cannot be ignored. Coates, not 
Pelton, directed and introduced Paco to Acosta. Without her 
participation, the drug transaction would not have occurred. On the 
other hand, either because of her involvement at the 7-Eleven due to 
the request by Agent Acosta or because Pelton had no involvement in 
the actual drug deal, the actions of Darrin Pelton failed to meet 
the proscribed standard for "arranging" the distribution of a 
controlled substance. 
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The court below did not dispute that "The deal still 
happens between Lorraine [Coates] and Paco. And it's Paco who tells 
them [Acosta and his informant] where to go, not Mr. Pelton." 
(T 42) . Pelton did not direct Paco to Acosta. Despite 
acknowledging this fact, the court went on to find that "maybe you 
could have let [Lorraine] Coates out of this and he [Pelton] would 
have been there and it still would have gone down with the action 
which he took." (T 47). The court erred in its finding because 
nothing happened with the actions taken by Pelton which linked him 
to the drug deal. At Pelton's request, the parties simply drove to 
a 7-Eleven. Lorraine Coates, acting independently of Pelton, 
directed Paco to Acosta. 
It is significant as well that the trial court found the 
drug transaction might have occurred even without Coates. The trial 
court incorrectly applied a less than beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard to the evidence in assessing the testimony. 
When Pelton met Agent Acosta, he got into Acosta's car and 
told him "that they would have to drive to a 7-Eleven . . . and 'the 
man would bring cocaine to that location./M Appellee's brief at 
3-4; (T 8, 18). Upon their arrival at the 7-Eleven, nobody brought 
them cocaine. In fact nothing happened until "Agent Acosta told the 
informant to call Coates over to Acosta's car."1 Appellee's brief 
1
 In addition to downplaying Agent Acosta's role of 
reinitiating the entire "sting" operation, the State disagrees with 
another element of the causation issue: Appellant Pelton's use of a 
"'but for' test for determining that a person arranged to distribute 
a controlled substance." Appellee's brief at 9. The State contends 
(continued) 
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at 4; (T.Tr. at 9). Acosta may have also told Coates that he was 
uncomfortable with the presence of Baker and Pelton, (T 9), but that 
fact is irrelevant for the sufficiency of the evidence analysis. As 
the State acknowledged, after Coates came over to Acosta7s vehicle, 
"She told Acosta that she understood and called Paco over . . . ." 
Appellee's brief at 4; (T 9). Independent of any action by Pelton, 
Paco came over, told Acosta that there was no cocaine, and directed 
him to the appropriate location across town where a drug deal took 
(footnote 1 continued) 
that, "Nothing requires that a person's actions be so integral to 
the distribution that the distribution could not occur without that 
person's participation. Any knowledgable lending of aid, in 
whatever form, is sufficient for conviction." Appellee's brief at 
9-10. 
Appellant Pelton discigrees. In order to be an 
"accomplice," a person must do more than simply fall under a literal 
reading of the statute. U.C.A. § 76-2-202 (an accomplice is one 
"who solicits, requests, commeinds, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person" in the commission of an offense). At first blush, 
this statute would appear to make a purchaser of narcotics liable as 
an accomplice to the crime of distributing a controlled substance. 
The purchaser "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids" the distribution by buying from the seller. A 
second review of the statute, however, reveals that "[t]he purchaser 
of narcotics is not an accomplice of the seller, as the offense of 
the purchaser is "possession" and not "selling." State v. Kasai, 
495 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1972). 
Similarly, if the terms "intentional aid" or "any act in 
furtherance thereof" were in fact proper interpretions and 
expansions of the "arranging" statute, they should not have been 
applied to the actions of Appellant Pelton. Allowing the court to 
apply a literal reading of the statute to the case at bar would also 
allow it to apply the statute to an individual who assists a known 
drug dealer change a tire in order to obtain cocaine. Even if the 
tire-changer knows about the impending transaction and specifically 
acts in furtherance of obtaining the drugs, the tire-changer would 
not be considered an "accomplice" even though his actions 
"intentionally aided" the transaction. Cf. Kasai, 495 P.2d at 12 66; 
see also Appellant's brief at 16. 
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place. (MS 36); (T 9-10). 
Paco would not have approached Acosta without the prompting 
of Lorraine Coates. Paco did not approach Acosta based upon the 
actions taken by Pelton. If Pelton had acted in furtherance of the 
drug transaction, the State would have had to prove Paco acted at 
Pelton's direction. The State could not prove any nexus between 
Pelton and Paco as it related to the transaction. According to the 
State, "[a]t the 7-Eleven, defendant [Pelton] and Baker go out of 
the vehicle and walked to the telephone booths where they approached 
a man who was using the telephone (T.Tr. at 8-9 and 19-20). That 
man was later identified as Paco (T.Tr. at 9). After defendant and 
Baker spoke with Paco, Agent Acosta told the informant to call 
Coates over to Acosta's car (T.Tr. at 9)." Appellee's brief at 4. 
Agent Acosta, still seated in his car, did not hear any of 
the conversation between Paco and Pelton. (T 27). The court 
incorrectly inferred that Paco and Pelton had in fact discussed the 
drug transaction when there was no testimony to support this 
conclusion. Pelton did not arrange the transaction. If Pelton did 
make an arrangement with Paco, Paco would have approached Acosta at 
Pelton's direction. Instead of an introduction of Paco to Acosta by 
Pelton, however, nothing happened at Pelton's hand. After his 
conversation with Paco, Pelton walked over to a pick-up truck. 
(T 20). He did not return to Acosta's car nor did he introduce or 
direct Acosta to Paco. (T 20). As the State noted, "defendant's 
involvement ceased at that point . . . ." Appellee's brief at 9. 
Pelton's statements directing the agent to a 7-Eleven where no 
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transaction occurred did not constitute culpable conduct. Lorraine 
Coates is the person responsible for finding, directing, and 
introducing Acosta—at his urging—to Paco. 
POINT II 
THE SUBSTANCE OF APPELLANTS ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE 
STATUTE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO HIM. 
(Reply to Points II & III) 
The State submits that "[t]he record in the present [case] 
is devoid of any claim below that the arranging statute was 
unconstitutionally applied to defendant [Pelton].11 Appellee's brief 
at 11. The record below, however, does include Pelton7s "Trial 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." 
(R 50-56). Therein, Pelton denied that he ever "offered, agreed, 
consented to, or arranged that transaction or distributed the 
substance or possessed a controlled substance . . . [in violation of 
U.C.A. §] 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) . . . ." (R 52). After listing various 
opinions addressing the breadth of the statute, Pelton also noted 
that "there is no evidence to support a conviction for arranging or 
distribution under subsection (ii)." (R 55). 
The essense of Pelton's argument was that the statute did 
not apply to him. If Pelton7s actions did not fall under the 
language of an inapplicable statute nor within the parameters of the 
listed opinions, the reach of the statute could not constitutionally 
encompass the case at bar without unduly broadening the meaning and 
application of the statute. Pelton argued that the statute did not 
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apply to him in his "Trial Memorandum/1 (R 50-56) , and, again, at 
trial: 
He [Pelton] didn't participate. He didn't 
facilitate. He didn't arrange. He didn't discuss 
prices. And as I have indicated, nothing regarding 
the deal was within his control: where the deal 
took place, what the deal was about, how much money 
was involved, none of that. At least some of that 
would have to be involved for |*a1 conviction 
funder] the arranging subsection. 
(T 40) (emphasis added). While Appellant Pelton admits that, at 
trial, he did not use the exact words argued on appeal, the 
substance of his argument nonetheless remains the same. 
As noted previously, Appellant's brief at 15, the 
applicable statute made it unlawful only if a person agreed, 
consented. offered, arranged, or negotiated the distribution of a 
controlled substance. U.C.A. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). The statute does 
not prohibit "any act in furtherance thereof" or "any intentional 
aid." Compare Appellant's brief at 14-17 with Appellee's brief at 
8. If the legislature had intended to proscribe "any activity," it 
would have inserted those words into the statute and deleted the 
five terms currently in their place. 
Since the legislature did not prohibit "any act in 
furtherance thereof," any judicial expansion of the proscribed 
statutory language was improper. "[I]t is for the legislature, not 
the courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct." State v. 
Green, No. 890222 (Utah App. May 23, 1990) (construing State v. 
Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913). 
- 7 -
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant, Darrin Lamar Pelton, 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this /jy day of June, 1990. 
E^LIZABfeTH y . ^ BOWMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RONALD S. vFUqiNO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
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RONALD S. FUJINO 
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ADDENDUM A 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (effective until 
July 1, 1990) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it 
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it shall 
be unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to have a 
controlled substance distributed or dispensed 
for value. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminallv IIAMP «<* 
